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‘I HAVE REGAINED MEMORY’ (SMṚTIR LABDHĀ):
THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ AS A PARRHESIASTIC JOURNEY
AGAINST FORGETFULNESS
RAQUEL FERRÁNDEZ-FORMOSO

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an interdisciplinary reading of the Bhagavad Gītā,
presenting it as a parrhesiastic dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, and focusing on the
importance attached to memory. Foucault’s studies on the exercise of parrhesia (“true speech”)
in the Greco-Roman context, but also Heidegger's views on the original memory, and
Abhinavagupta’s commentary to the Bhagavad Gītā have been used as important tools of
interpretation. Devotion is described as the constant memory of Kṛṣṇa, through which the
practitioner succeeds in substituting some subconscious dispositions (saṃskāras) for others,
building a psychic memory that allows for liberation at the time of death. On the one hand,
Kṛṣṇa’s goal is to awaken transcendental memory in Arjuna, on the other, at the end of the
Gītā we are invited to remember and study this sacred conversation. This leads us to establish
a comparison between the use of memory promoted in the Bhagavad Gītā and in the Epicurean
school, highlighting important similarities and differences between the two pedagogies.
Keywords: death, devotion, emotions, Epicurus, guṇa, happiness, parrhesia, remembrance,
saṃskāras, truth

1. THE KAIROS OF THE SOUL
In one of the Epictetus' most unique dissertations, a disciple asks the Stoic master why
he never answers his questions. The answer of Epictetus is visceral in its frankness: the
disciple in question does not move him to speak since he does not possess the
competence to listen. “About what should I talk to you? Tell me. About what matter
are you able to listen?” (peri tinos oun legō pros se; deixon moi. peri tinos akousai
dunasai; Dissertations, II, 24). Foucault quotes this passage, intitled: “To one of those
whom he did not deem worthy”, several times in his famous studies on the exercise of
parrhesia in the Greco-Roman context (Foucault 2012, 177). The Greek term
‘parrhesia’ has two possible meanings, which give it two very different senses. In a
rather pejorative sense, parrhesia implies “to say (rhema; lit: “utterance”) everything
________________________
FERRÁNDEZ-FORMOSO, RAQUEL: Department of Philosophy, National Distance
Education University, Spain. Email: ferrandez.raquel@gmail.com

Comparative Philosophy 11.2 (2020)

FERRÁNDEZ-FORMOSO

37

(pan)”, which is a symptom of charlatanism rather than wisdom, because the person
who thus exercises parrhesia (i.e. the parrhesiastes) expresses “any or everything has
in mind without qualification” (Foucault 2001,13). In Christian literature, we find a
constant denunciation of this unfiltered talk1, which makes true silence impossible and
therefore it is conceived as “an obstacle to the contemplation of God” (Foucault 2001,
13). But already Epictetus, in his Enchiridion, sharply warned against this harmful
parrhesia: “Keep silent most of the time, and say only what is necessary to be said, in
a few words. Only rarely and when the occasion calls for it, we will say something.”
(kai siōpē polu estō ē laleisthō ta anagkaia kai di'oligōn. spaniōs de pote kairou
parakalountos epi to legein lexon men; Ench. XXXIII). It is important to learn to
discern what this appropriate occasion is, -the kairos that invites us to speak-, which in
turn will be related to the competence of our interlocutor to listen. Discerning the
conditions necessary for a true conversation (a frank saying for a frank ear), becomes
a particularly relevant task when what we are going to say is the truth, whatever the
consequences may be. This is precisely the other meaning of the term 'parrhesia': “to
tell the truth”. And this is the most widespread use of the term in Greek-Roman
literature. The parrhesiastes, therefore, is one who has the courage to tell the truth,
even if this could seriously harm him or her; as opposed to the flatterer, the exercise of
truth becomes for the parrhesiastes a duty and a way of relating freely to
himself/herself and to others (see Foucault 2012,178; 2001, 14-15). The nexus between
parrhesia and self-care crosses in different ways the discourse of Hellenistic
philosophies and makes the exercise of truth a “techne of spiritual guidance for the
education of the soul” (Foucault 2001,110). The difference between the Hellenistic
parrhesia and the parrhesia of Christian spirituality has to do with the subject from
whom this parrhesia is required: in Greco-Roman philosophy it is the master who must
exercise the parrhesia, while in Christianity will be the disciple who must confess his
soul to the master. “It is quite characteristic to note that in [Greco-Roman] philosophy
there is a great concern for imposing silence on the disciple. [...] for the disciple is
essentially the one who is silent, while in Christianity the disciple will be the one who
must speak.” (Foucault 2012, 160). The parrhesiastes, in the Hellenistic context, is “an
agent of gnôthi seauton”, a “kairos technician”, a director of souls who embodies what
he says, since parrhesia has become “the presence of his own way of life made manifest,
presented, sensitive and active as a model in the discourse he maintains.” (Foucault
2012,181). It is the figure in which we find a harmony between saying and doing, and
therefore, the truth is transmitted as a way of being, through his/her presence, rather
than as a theoretical idea. Taking literally, it is what the Sanskrit term ‘ācārya’ (‘master’,
‘teacher’) alludes, in reference to one who has fulfilled the ācāra (‘good conduct’,
‘good behavior’), and the one who has already undertaken (‘ā-carati’; ‘to practice’, ‘to
approach’) the paths by which he leads his disciples.
1

The Quietist movement initiated by the Spanish mystic Miguel de Molinos (fifteenth century CE) is
perhaps the one that most vindicates contemplative silence as a place of encounter with God, considering
that verbal meditation (and this includes prayer and any other kind of verbal activity) is always an inferior
means of relating to the divine.
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In the Bhagavad Gītā (henceforth: BG) we are offered a mystical parrhesia,
between a Divine Friend (‘suhṛt’ or ‘sakhi’; BG, 9.18 and 10.44), an avatar who as
Aurobindo (1997,18) indicates, only manifests as such when the occasion has come,
on the battlefield of Kurukṣetra, and an interlocutor, Arjuna, who throughout the first
chapter possesses nothing but the sensible and logical arguments of a reason stripped
of vision and driven to despair. Indeed, the Gītā begins at the moment when Arjuna has
very persuasive reasons, apparently irrefutable for not fighting, and thus abandoning
all efforts and all desire for victory. Faced with the injustice of the world, alone with
the dam of his reason, Arjuna joins in an understandable but self-centered misfortune.
This beginning should not be interpreted lightly, for, as Aurobindo claims in his
commentary: “Arjuna has sought to justify his refusal on ethical and rational grounds,
but he has merely cloaked by words of apparent rationality the revolt of his ignorant
and unchastened emotions” (1997, 61). However, if Arjuna were not receptive to
listening, the dialogue of the Gītā would culminate in this first chapter: rational, logical
and tragic. It would be rather an impossibility of dialogue, a convincing but empty
monologue. Therefore, the parrhesiastic exercise actually begins from the second
chapter, when Kṛṣṇa finds the opportunity to guide a soul willing to hear something
greater than his own arguments. Only in that circumstance -fullfiled the conditions of
the kairos- does Kṛṣṇa agrees to impart a teaching that forces him out of His incognito,
dropping the veil of His power (yogamāyā; BG, 7.25) and revealing Himself to Arjuna
no longer as a mere friend, but as the master of the eternal dharma (BG, 11.18). These
'kairos-conditions' are related to the Arjuna's competence to listen, that is to say: to his
capacity and necessity -as a disciple- of remaining silent. In fact, one of Kṛṣṇa's last
warnings highlights the importance of always being open to listening: “If you do not
listen (na śroṣyasi) to Me because of your arrogance, you will get lost” (BG, 18.58).
Through this sacred conversation, Arjuna will not only recover his own essence, but
will also realize the identity of the master, whom he had taken for an ordinary friend
(BG, 11.41). Kṛṣṇa dwells within what He says, while Arjuna, unable to live satisfied
nowhere, must fix his mind on the Divine- Friend, learn the language of stillness, fill
his heart with gratitude and remain silent. In Kṛṣṇa's words: “to whom censorship and
praise are equal, who is silent (maunī), satisfied with everything that comes to him,
homeless (aniketa), with his mind firmly established (sthiramati) and full of devotion
- that person is dear to Me” (BG, 12.19). From our perspective, what the Divine Friend
is going to provide to Arjuna are not convincing arguments to make him change his
mind; it is not rhetorical persuasion that Govinda employs, since it is not the power of
reason what is at stake.
Furthermore, throughout this paper, we will interpret the song of Bhagavān as a
healing journey from forgetfulness to original Memory (smṛti), by means of a true
speech/being that has the purpose not to convince or demonstrate, but to transform. “I
dwell in the heart of all beings; from me come Memory (smṛti) and knowledge (jñāna)
and also their loss” (BG, 15.15), declares Kṛṣṇa. It is this original memory -the presence
of the source-, that needs to be awakened in the despondent heart of a calculating and
rational Arjuna. Throughout the Gītā, the noun ‘smṛti’ (lit. “which is remembered”), as
well as other verbal forms related to the root ‘smṛ’ (“remembering”; “remembrance”;
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“desire”) will often be emphasized in a meaningful way. It should be taken into account
the last words of Arjuna, at the end of this transcendental conversation: naṣṭo mohaḥ
smṛtir labdhā (“The delusion has dissolved, I have regained Memory”; BG, 18.73).
The Sanskrit term smṛti is often translated in an ambiguous way because it swings
between the meaning of “awareness” or “mindfulness” and the meaning of “memory”.
This has given rise to some debates about the most successful translation in various
philosophical contexts (see Ditrich 2013), and thus, it is common to read Arjuna’s last
words translated in this way: “The delusion has dissolved, I have regained the
awareness (of the Self)”. 2 In our view, not only are not these two meanings
incompatible, but they can be understood as one. This polysemy of the term smṛti and
its associated terms (from the forms smaraṇa, samaratva or anusmara) becomes deeper
if we consider that the vocabulary related to memory, the awakening of the mind and
love (including the broad spectrum of desire) come together in the Sanskrit root ‘smṛ’,
in a way impossible to reproduce in English using only one word. Besides, the term
‘smṛti’ implies “tradition” and is the name given to a body of texts -among which is the
epic literature itihāsa3, and therefore the Mahābhārata-, which are distinguished from
the authoritative textual corpus of the Śruti (lit. “which is heard”), in reference to the
revealed scriptures of the Vedas. As Gerald James Larson argued, the term smṛti should
be considered as a multiple-dimensional “portmanteau expression” (1993, 375).
According to this author, memory is recognized only as a legitimate means of
knowledge (pramāṇa or pramā) by the Jains, and this in an ambiguous manner (Larson
1993, 376). But this does not prevent the existence of other dimensions of memory,
which do not refer to a mere cognitive faculty, and which transcend the conception of
memory as a mere retrieval of past particular experiences. In fact, the richness of this
term shows that memory is recognized as a potential transcendental faculty associated
with meditative exercise, and also at the same time the fact that certain states of mind
reached through meditation are understood as an access to a Memory that is not verbal,
nor imaginal, but transcendental, and whose effect is manifested in the embodied
presence. Furthermore, the teaching that Kṛṣṇa imparts to Arjuna is not the knowledge
of something that Arjuna never knew and will now learn; nor is the knowledge of
something that Arjuna knew and has forgotten, in the sense of not having properly
retained it in his mind. It is not a retentive exercise the journey to Memory that the Gītā
presents to us. The sort of remembrance which is at stake is more linked to being than
to thinking, more original and closer to keeping than to retaining. In short, it is a way
of witnessing life what Kṛṣṇa comes to awaken in Arjuna. In this regard, the
consideration of Memory found in the Gītā is similar to Heidegger’s consideration of
remembering as the source of thought and gratitude.
Originally, ‘memory’ means much as devotion. A constant concentrated abiding with
something- not just with something that has passed, but in the same way with what is

2

Cf., Osborne and Kulkarni (trans.) 2012), 309.
The expression iti ha āsa (“so indeed it was”) it is the name given to a Hindu genre of literature, whose
representative works are Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa.

3
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present and with what may come. What is past, present, and to come appears in the oneness
of its own present being. (Heidegger 2004,140)
Memory as a sign of eternity, of what always remains as a continuous present is

manifested in gratitude for the gift of being, in a devotion for what must be thought:
“The thanc, as the original memory, is already pervaded by that thinking back which
devotes what it thinks to that which is to be thought. It is pervaded by thanks”.
(Heidegger 2004,142). Thus, Heidegger will often wonder whether the memory is “no
more than a container for the thoughts of thinking” or if, on the contrary, “thinking
itself resides in memory” (2004,139). It is precisely through a call to devotion and
thankfulness, that Kṛṣṇa is going to ask Arjuna to remember Him and armed with the
light of this remembrance to put aside the laziness, complaint, and obfuscation of his
mind, and prepare for the true fight. If Martin Heidegger, from the Greek term
‘aletheia’, understands truth as the unconcealed or the unveiled (‘a-leth’), Harald
Weinrich relates this term to the negation of forgetfulness (i.e. the negation of the
semantic element ‘leth’, where the name for the river of forgetting comes from:
“Lethe”). Thus, according to Weinrich:
on the basis of the construction of the word aletheia one can also conceive truth as the
“unforgotten” or the “not-to-be-forgotten”. In fact, for hundreds of years Western
philosophical thought, following the Greeks, sought truth on the side of not-forgetting and
thus of memory and remembrance. (2004, 4)

The last words of Arjuna also reveal the close relationship that maintains both,
eternal truth and memory, since it is due to Kṛṣṇa in the shape of Acyuta (“the
imperishable”) as Arjuna acknowledges having recovered the Self (BG, 18.73). In fact,
to understand the semantic malleability of the term smṛti it is sufficient to notice the
three possible translations of Arjuna’s final statement (“smṛtir labdhā”). Hitherto, we
have anticipated two, namely: a) “I have regained memory”, and b) “I have regained
the awareness (of the Self)”. However, in which could be considered one of the most
literal English translation of the Bhagavad Gītā, Franklin Edgerton (1944, 179)
translates smṛtir labdhā as c) “attention (to the truth) is won”. Thus, this two-word
expression can mean the recovery of memory, the awareness (of the Self), and the
attention (to the truth), all at once. At any rate, at the end of the dialogue what was
concealed comes to light and is now perceived by the power of vision, which falls on
this transcendental Memory acquired by Arjuna in an exercise of listening, openness
and humility.“I stand free from doubt”, Arjuna concludes, “I shall do Your words”
(kariṣye vacanaṃ tava; BG, 18.73).
Concerning this mystical parrhesia, we are willing to argue that in the sacred
conversation (dharma-saṃvādah; BG, 18.70) between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, lies a danger
which is obviously not a political risk such as that posed to us by certain historical
episodes in Ancient Greece (for example in the case of a parrhesiasthes Plato in
Syracuse). Nor is it the risk of the friend who by telling the truth puts a particular
relationship at risk. Nevertheless, there is a much greater risk in this journey that Kṛṣṇa
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is undertaking, even if it is assumed to be in a position of higher power with respect to
Arjuna. The parrhesiastes Kṛṣṇa does not gamble His life, but the possibility of being
remembered, that is to say: the possibility of being alive through the presence of those
who embody Memory. He risks, in particular, being rejected once and for all in favor
of forgetting that reason requires, in certain situations, to be true. Ultimately, we should
wonder if there is a greater risk than that of the Divine Friend when finally finds the
kairos of speaking frankly to the soul.

2. DEFEAT IS THERE, WHERE FORGETTING IS
I'm a poor audience for my memory
W. Szymborska

The dialogue of the Bhagavad Gītā comprises eighteen chapters (from chapter 25 to
42) of the sixth book of the Mahābhārata, entitled “Bhīṣma parva” (“Book of
Bhīṣma”). If we read the Gītā as an individual text, separate from this book, as it is
usually done, our reading begins with the “Yoga of Arjuna’s grief” (“arjuna-viṣādayogaḥ”). In this first chapter of the Gītā, Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa to lead his chariot to the
center of the battlefield in order to contemplate his enemies. Then we see the
despondency of Arjuna, possessed by compassion (kṛpā), and we are offered a
monologue of arguments, objections and complaints, which plunge the warrior into
skepticism, sadness, and paralysis. However, if we read the Gītā in the context of the
book to which it belongs, the attitude of Arjuna will seem to us quite paradoxical and
unstable, considering that only four chapters before, this warrior was totally convinced
of the victory, and even comforted his brother Yudhiṣṭhira by exhibiting a pearl of
wisdom worthy of Kṛṣṇa Himself. Indeed, in chapter 21 of the Bhīṣma Parvan, it is
Yudhiṣṭhira, the king of the pāṇḍavas, who feels sorrow (viṣāda) when observing the
troops of his enemies. Doubts overwhelm him because of the strength and weapons of
the opposing army, led by the fearsome warrior Bhīṣma: “with our troops, we are
doubtful (of victory)” (te vayaṃ saṃśayaṃ prāptāḥ sa sainyāḥ; MhB, 6.21.5), he
confesses to Arjuna. In our view, the answer that Arjuna provides to his brother
deserves special attention, since it reveals a force of spirit whose loss will lead to the
dialogue of the Gītā. Effectively, what Arjuna reminds him is that the determining
factor in battle is not quantity but quality, and that the true warrior does not overcome
by the force of his external weapons, but by the firm strength of his internal ones.
na tathā balavīryābhyāṃ vijayante jigīṣavaḥ
yathāsatyānṛśaṃsyābhyāṃ dharmeṇaivodyamena ca/
tyaktvādharmaṃ ca lobhaṃ ca mohaṃ codyamam āsthitāḥ
yudhyadhvam anahaṃkārā yato dharmas tato jayaḥ/
evaṃ rājan vijānīhi dhruvo 'smākaṃ raṇe jayaḥ
yathā me nāradaḥ prāha yataḥ kṛṣṇas tato jayaḥ/
guṇabhūto jayaḥ kṛṣṇe pṛṣṭhato 'nveti mādhavam
anyathā vijayaś cāsya saṃnatiś cāparo guṇaḥ/
ananta tejā govindaḥ śatrupūgeṣu nirvyathaḥ
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puruṣaḥ sanātanatamo yataḥ kṛṣṇas tato jayaḥ /
(MhB, 6.21.10-14)
Those who desire victory do not conquer so much by power (vīryā) or by force (bala) as
by truth (satya), kindness (anṛśaṃsa), virtue (dharma) and perseverance (udyama). Having
given up injustice (adharma), greed (lobha), and delusion (moha), and remaining firm
during the course of the battle without arrogance (anahaṃkāra), for victory is there where
righteousness is. Know this, oh king, our victory in this battle is certain. As Nārada told
me: victory is there where Kṛṣṇa is (yataḥ kṛṣṇas tato jayaḥ). Victory depends on Kṛṣṇa,
it is intrinsic to Madhava, just as humility is his other attribute. Govinda, brilliant and
infinite, even in the midst of a multitude of enemies remains calm. He is the most eternal
of beings; where is Kṛṣṇa, there is victory.

How to reconcile this triumphant discourse, based on faith in Kṛṣṇa's energy, truth,
and justice, with the dejected and skeptical mood that overwhelms Arjuna at the
beginning of the Gītā? Only four chapters later, Arjuna will fall into a dejection much
worse than Yudhiṣṭhira, and his own words of comfort will vanish at the imminent
beginning of the battle. Certainly, kindness could be a secret weapon for victory, but
not self-pity, as Kṛṣṇa will have to remind him later. Likewise, humility (saṃnati) is a
crucial trait of those who fight in the name of dharma, but not false modesty or
victimhood. The degree of confidence transmitted by Arjuna while reassuring his
brother is proportional to the degree of despair in which he is about to plunge: “I do not
desire victory, Kṛṣṇa, nor kingdom, nor pleasures. Of what use to us is kingdom,
Govinda, or pleasures or even life?” (BG, 1.32). On the one hand, the extreme mood
swings experienced by Arjuna are significant, since a crucial part of Kṛṣṇa's teaching
is based on moderation or equanimity (samatvaṃ; BG, 2.40), that is, on the sage's
ability to remain unperturbed (sama) both in the joy as in pain (samaduḥkhasukhaṃ
dhīram; 2.15). On the other hand, we have underlined the beginning of the interrogation:
“of what use to us”, which literally translated would be “what [is] to us” (kiṃ naḥ),
since this kind of question seems to be a sentence already doomed to failure, rather than
a real interrogation. The question about the meaning of life, of victory or of joy,
formulated in this way, may symbolize to what extent Arjuna has forgotten what Kṛṣṇa
represents, what dharma truly means. Thus, from “victory is there where Kṛṣṇa is”
(yataḥ kṛṣṇas tato jayaḥ), we have suddenly turned to “defeat is there, where forgetting
is” (which in Sanskrit could be “yato vismṛtis tato'jaya”). The meaning of life, or of its
own path (sva-dharma) becomes blurred, and the result is mood paralysis and
impotence. Even when Arjuna argues that it is the fulfillment of dharma that prevents
him from fighting (BG, 1.40-41), and even if his reasoning throughout the first chapter
of the Gītā seems sensible and hardly refutable, it is only his own particular ego that
complains, becomes frustrated and feels sorry for his bad luck. The limits of his vision
have been narrowed to the point that the questions Arjuna is able to ask himself, in such
a state, can only lead him to a dead end. These are questions that only bear fruit in
certain conditions, for they need the gray and narrow atmosphere that only amnesia
provides with. Apparently, Arjuna has lost all anchor points in the heart where ātman
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or puruṣa dwell (see Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.3.17 and Praśna upaniṣad 3.6). But not quite.
Otherwise, it would not have been possible for him to remain open to memory, to the
willingness to re-cordare (from Latin etymology: to go through the heart [cor] again
[re]). After Kṛṣṇa reproves him for his pusillanimity (“hṛdayadaurbalya”; lit.
“weakness of heart”), Arjuna adopts another very different internal position, which
indicates at least the will to overcome his critical state: "I am your disciple, I beg you,
teach me” (BG, 2.7). And as the Gītā reveals to us, this internal collapse of Arjuna, this
sudden amnesia that manifests itself with all its power at the beginning of the journey
constitutes the blank space (the dark night) that every soul is required to grow. Until
the beginning of the Gītā, Arjuna felt comfortable with his role as a warrior (kṣatriya),
but he played it for reasons of a lower order, although legitimate and dignified. Now,
at the time of the crisis, he must face a higher law: the one that urges him to follow
only the path of Self, and to do so, first abandon all dharmas. As Aurobindo states,
what Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa is a law, a path, a code of conduct to follow: “give me, [Arjuna]
practically asks, that which I have lost, a true law, a clear rule of action, a path by which
I can again conﬁdently walk. He does not ask for the secret of life or of the world, the
meaning, and purpose of it all, but for a dharma” (1997:26). Indeed, Arjuna himself
confesses that his mind is bewildered with respect to dharma (dharmasammūḍhacetāḥ;
BG, 2.7) and asks Kṛṣṇa to indicate the best way to follow.
The term 'dharma' is crucial in the context of Indian philosophy, and its semantic
field is overwhelming (eg. it can be render as “virtue”, “religion”, “nature”, “law”,
“justice”, “path”, it is also the name given to a part of Buddha's teachings and this is by
no means an exhaustive list). However, certain authors such as Shyam Ranganatham
argue that, regardless of the context in which this term is used, its intentional content
is always the same. “Dharma has just one, moral meaning in the classical Indian
circumstance, which is the meaning of all key philosophical moral terms, like ‘ethics’
and ‘moral’ ” (Ranganathan 2017, 114). According to this, the idea that the term
‘dharma’ is polysemic and refers to different meanings according to its context,
corresponds to an “Extensionalist” point of view, which Ranganathan calls “the
orthodox view”. In turn, this author proposes that the term ‘dharma’ should be
considered a “perfect formal moral term, without focus” (2017, 96). This assessment is
important to us, if we take into account that one of the conclusions of Kṛṣṇa's teaching
consists precisely in the recommendation to abandon all dharmas: "Abandoning all
dharmas, take refuge in Me" (BG, 18.66). Thus, even if at the beginning of his teaching,
Kṛṣṇa reminds Arjuna his social duty (or dharma) as a warrior (BG, 2.32-2.38), the
Gītā would not have acquired the universal and timeless importance that it holds today,
as a transnational spiritual reference guide, if Kṛṣṇa's teaching were simply based on
remembering the moral demands regarding a particular culture and time (i.e. the moral
of Indian society during the time of songwriting). This does not mean that Kṛṣṇa is
disinterested in morality, in a negative-sense -much less that his message is immoral-.
On the contrary, what this indicates, rather, is that the universality of his teaching relies
on a pearl of higher-level wisdom than the social or particular normative
recommendations because as Aurobindo states, the Gītā “replaces the conception of
social duty by a divine obligation” (1997, 35). Important to note, in the first verse of
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the Gītā, the battlefield of Kurukṣetra is called ‘Dharmakṣetra’, suggesting that what is
going to take place is the battle of dharma versus a-dharma (i.e. the battle of good
against evil). Significantly, in his commentary on Bhagavad Gītā entitled
Bhagavadgītārthasaṃgraha (henceforth: GS), the great Kashmiri thinker
Abhinavagupta considers that the word “kṣetra” refers to the body (śarīra) in this
particular context. Thus, playing with the root kṣi (to destroy), from which the term
‘kṣetra’ could be derived, he declares: “Liberation is obtained through the destruction
of all dharmas” (“samastadharmāṇāṃ kṣayādapavargaprāptyā”; GS, 1.1). According
to this, the body is the battlefield in which all dharmas must be destroyed to obtain
liberation (apavarga). However, Abhinavagupta also takes into account the root kṣad
(“to confront”, “to attack”), another possible etymological source for the term ‘ṣetra’,
in which case the body would become the field in which the battle between
contradictory desires takes place 4 . In our view, the consideration of Kurukṣetra as
“Dharmakṣetra” is significant since Arjuna will learn to fight from that recovered
memory (smṛtir labdhā) that Kṛṣṇa awakens in him, that is to say: rooted in the heart
of a path where all personal and social dharmas, and the respective desires that
accompany them, have to be abandoned.
Certainly, what Kṛṣṇa tries to awake in Arjuna is the highest path to the Self, which
is related to a certain ability for action, precisely one of the definitions of ‘yoga’ that
Gītā brings up: “yoga is skill in action” (yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam; BG, 2.50), which
in turn is related to detachment and equanimity (“equanimity is called yoga”; samatvaṃ
yoga ucyate; BG, 2.48). Although the term ‘yoga’ also plays a crucial role in the setting
of Indian philosophy, it is necessary to highlight that in this context “the word yoga has
not attained any definite technical sense, as it did en Patañjali's Yoga-sūtra, and, in
consequence, there is not one definition of yoga, but many” (Dasgupta 1932, 451).
However, it is in this text that we find formulated the three paths of yoga (namely:
karma yoga, “the yoga of action”; jñāna yoga, “the yoga of wisdom”; and bhakti yoga,
the yoga of devotion) that are considered today the “cardinal directions” or the
“conceptual filters” of the so-called “premodern yoga” (see De Michelis 2008,18).
Everything seems to indicate that the fundamental meaning of the term ‘yoga’ in
Kṛṣṇa's teaching, has the general character of a spiritual practice which implies a kind
of union for which separation or isolation of certain mental states is required, especially
desires. Surendranath Dasgupta already warned of the meaning of this yoga (“union”)
which is always also a sort of “viyoga” (“disjunction”)5: “The reason why this negative
concept of cessation of desires should be regarded as yoga is that without such a
renunciation of desires no higher kind of union is possible” (1932, 444). The path of
“abandoning all dharmas” consists of nourishing a single desire which becomes rather
an intimate aspiration to take refuge solely in the Divine Friend. At this point, it should
4

See for instance: Marjanovic (trans.) 2004, 30-31. For further readings on Abhinavagupta's
commentary, see also: Sankaranarayanam, S. (trans.) 1985.
5
This is also pointed out by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary to Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.3.11, where yoga is
defined as “sthirām indriya dhāraṇām” or “steady control of the senses”. Śaṅkara argues then, that this
sort of union (yoga) involves a disjuntion (viyoga) concerning another thing (i.e., the yogi concentrates
on the Self [yoga] and abandons all the distractions [viyoga] that lead him to ignorance)
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be noted that devotion to Kṛṣṇa in the context of the Gītā implies metaphorically
renouncing the boundaries maintained with other masters or reference models (i.e.
being guided by Kṛṣṇa, the pāṇḍavas will have to fight with their previous preceptors).
In a significant episode, just before the battle begins, Yudhiṣṭira will ask for the
benediction of his four previous masters who are on the enemy side: Bhīṣma, Droṇa,
Kṛpa, and Śalya. The reader familiar with the Bhīṣma Parva will remember the
identical answer that the four characters provide: “A man is a servant of wealth, but
wealth is not servant of anyone. I am bound to the Kauravas by wealth.” (arthasya
puruṣo dāso; dsas tv artha na kasya cit [...] Baddho'smi arthena Kauravaiḥ.; MhB,
6.43.41,56,71,82). They all wish Yudhiṣṭira's victory, however, as Bhīṣma and Droṇa
admit, they are not free, and they speak to him as “eunuchs” (klīvabat; lit. “like a weakminded”, “like a coward”; MhB, 6.43-42, 57). Perhaps it is Droṇa who best expresses
the situation they are in: “I will fight for the Kauravas, but I hope the victory will be
yours.” (yotsye'ham kauravasy'ārtha; tav'āśāsyo jayo mayā; MhB, 6.43.58). Thereby,
the spectator encounters unfolded in the Mahābhārata a whole range of loyalties and
affections between human and divine ties, intertwined with each other, in a way in
which it is easier to understand Arjuna's confusion about what is the right path (and the
right master) to follow. We could ask at this point if the action required of Arjuna, in
case he decides to follow the path of Self, could be considered a “teleological
suspension of the ethical”. This is what Abraham did, according to Kierkegaard, when
he agreed to sacrifice his son by divine mandate. According to Kierkegaard, from the
ethical domain Abraham is exposed to being nothing more than a murderer (of his own
son), however, from the religious perspective he is willing to make the leap to the
absurdity in which true faith consists (always related to the scandalous in Kierkegaard's
thinking). Thus, Abraham's action (or intention) by virtue of faith keeps an abysmal
difference with the figure of the tragic hero, since the former “still remains within the
ethical” (Kierkegaard 1994, 49). On the contrary, “by his act [Abraham] overstepped
the ethical entirely and possessed a higher telos outside of it, in relation to which he
suspended the former” (Kierkegaard 1994, 50). Similarly, there are two different stages
from which to consider Kṛṣṇa's teaching concerning the impossibility of the spirit
(puruṣa) killing or being killed (BG, 2.19-20, 27) since from an ethical point of view,
such justification for the battle supposes a dangerous fallacy, and yet, from a
transcendental point of view the required action goes beyond the ethical stage and
acquires a much deeper meaning. Hence, Aurobindo assertively states that “the Gītā is
not a book of practical ethics, but of the spiritual life” (1997, 31), and clarifies that
“[the Gītā] does not preach indifference to good and evil for the ordinary life of man,
where such a doctrine would have the most pernicious consequences” (1997, 37). From
our point of view, Arjuna is neither a tragic hero, nor a murderer, nor a believer in the
Christian sense. Precisely, Kṛṣṇa’s teaching aims at Arjuna not fighting simply by
obeying a social duty, nor by virtue of the absurd. The memory that Arjuna recovers at
the end of the conversation with the Divine Friend, may not be described in rational
terms but still it is not an irrational leap into the absurd: it is an intuitive understanding
(buddhi-yoga) that he acquires throughout the Gītā due to Kṛṣṇa’s words. Thus, the
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vision of Self sublimates both the blind absurdity in the Christian-religious stage, and
also the murder from an ethical perspective.
In the end, the road to highest freedom lead us to two apparent paradoxes, namely
that the dharma of Self demands abandoning all paths, and that the devotion to Self
results in selflessness for and equanimity to other potentially desired things. This is
how yoga, first defined as “the skill in action”, is directly related to “desireless action”
or niṣkāma-karma. Any action performed from the Self (i.e. from a mind steadfasted
in yoga) entails at the same time a disjunction (viyoga), since the yogi or yogini takes
distance with the results of it. However, this does not mean that the well-established
person in the Self must completely abandon his interest in the world, nor behave like
an emotional automaton for the sake of an inner connection with the Supreme. The
dialectical interplay between union-disjunction (i.e. yoga-viyoga) unfolds a more subtle
skill, namely the ability to find the right measure between closeness and estrangement,
commitment and indifference. To explain this, Geoffrey Ashton draws on the insights
of Edward Bullough about the importance of distance in aesthetic contemplation and
creation. This aesthetical distance involves a negative and a positive aspect:
But “the working of Distance” does not entail a total disengagement with the world (or
artwork); it also displays “a positive side- the elaboration of the experience on the new
basis created by the inhibitory action of Distance” (Bullough 1971, 760). […] while Arjuna
becomes yoked to the divine by transcending the phenomenal world, he does not essentially
depart from it (as Śaṅkara advocates), nor does he become purged of his own feelings (à la
Mīmāṃsāka model of ritual agency). Rather, he re-connects with the world in a way that
is simultaneously desireless and directly infused with sensitivities to others. (Ashton 2013,
13)

However, the teaching of the Gītā is not simply to carry out any action in a selfless
way. It is not any action that Arjuna is required, nor is it the most appropriate action
simply according to his social status. It is about carrying out the action that demands
the path of Self. In order to discern what this action is in each particular situation, the
first thing is to be willing to follow our own dharma (svadharma), whatever it may be,
instead of trying to imitate that of others (paradharma). In other words, in order to deal
with the situation Arjuna finds himself in, he must first accept the situation itself as
well as the role that has been given to him in the plot. Kṛṣṇa repeatedly stresses the
importance of this commitment to one's path (BG, 3.35;18.47). This same warning can
be found in the Enchiridion of Epictetus:
memnēso, hoti hupokritēs ei dramatos, hoiou an thelē ho didaskalos: an brakhu, brakheos:
an makron, makrou. […] son gar tout'esti, to dothen hupokrisnathai propōpon kalōs:
eklexasthai d'auto allou.
Remember (memnēso), that you are an actor of a drama (hoti hupokritēs ei dramatos) as
such sort as the director chooses (hoiou an thelē ho didaskalos) – if short, then in a short
one, if long, then in a long one. […] For your task is to play well the given role; but to
choose it, belongs to another (eklexasthai d'auto allou). (Ench., XVII)
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According to Epictetus6, the choice of the role is 'not up to us' (i.e. it is aprohaireta),

since it is outside the scope of prohairesis (“choice”) (Long 2002, 212). Following the
teaching of Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna should also be satisfied with everything that comes to him
(BG, 12.19), and precisely that harmonic acceptation is a symptom of wisdom, a
particular trait of a mind well steadfasted on Yoga. It is not a bare conformism or a
mere passive assentiment what it is demanded, but especially the impulse to act and to
react properly to the events that happen to us, without worthless hesitation,
despondency or complaint. The reaction -appropriate or not- to the role that has been
given to us by the “screenwriter”, does depend on us so accepting it is a first step in
order to carry it out correctly. Hence, “voluntarily” pursuing our own path instead of
interrupting it, or to imitate that of others is a teaching we find formulated both in the
philosophy of the Bhagavad Gītā and in the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus or Marcus
Aurelius7. For this acceptance of the personal path and for its correct fulfillment, an
intellect endowed with vision and open to listening is needed. Here the notion of
“buddhi-yoga” is introduced in the Gītā, which certain authors such as Edgerton
translate as “discipline of mental attitude”, but which is more common to find translated
as “the yoga of understanding”, or even “the yoga of vision”. In the second chapter we
are told that mere action is inferior to this “buddhi-yoga” (dūreṇa hyavaraṃ karma
buddhiyogāt; BG, 2.49) , since the one endowed with wisdom leaves good and evil
behind (buddhiyukto jahātīha ubhe sukṛtaduṣkṛte; BG, 2.50), that is to say, he or she
has transcended the conventional moral standards, and does not act moved by an
interest or a reward. Further on, Kṛṣṇa warns us that this buddhiyoga is only granted to
the loving devotees (BG, 10.10), those who have deposited their buddhi in Kṛṣṇa (mayi
buddhiṃ niveśaya; lit. “[let your] intellect enter into me”, BG 12.8). The intellective
organ or buddhi acquires great importance in the Gītā, since we are told that it can
perceive “the infinite bliss” that lies beyond the senses (sukhamātyantikaṃ […]
atīndriyam; BG, 6.21). Moreover, the yogi or the yogini gifted with this buddhi-yoga
will not fall into the negative tendency proper of demoniac beings (āsura bhūtāḥ, BG,
16.20), those who defend that “there is no truth in the world, neither God, nor
foundation, nor any law of cause-effect” (asatyam pratiṣṭhaṃ te jagadāhuranīśvaram
aparasparasambhūtaṃ; BG, 16.18) but instead, that everything is the result of personal
will or of desire. Again, this consideration prevents us from concluding that the yogi
or the yogini must simply leave moral standards behind and plunge into an amoral or
immoral void. On the contrary, guided by the divine vision that he/she perceives
through the intellect, the seeker commits himself/herself to the action that the Self
requires, and plunges his/her steps into the divine path, very different from the nihilistic
6

This acceptance of the role that has been given to us is also stressed by the Stoic Marcus Aurelius,
strongly influenced by Epictetus, whose Discourses came to him thanks to Rusticus. In a number of
passages of his Meditations, Marcus Aurelius invites us to accept the destiny that God have planned for
us. One example might be: “What a glorious power is granted to man! Never to do any action, but such
as God is to commend; and to embrace kindly, whatever God appoints for him” (Meditations, 12. 11).
See Moor and Hutcheson (2008).
7
In the words of Marcus Aurelius: “Consider, too, that, only to the rational animal it is given to follow
willingly what happens. But the bare following is a necessity upon all”; see Meditations, X.28.
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emptiness, the selfish complaint, or the persecution of personal goals. Arjuna's initial
bewilderment, at the beginning of the Gītā, could have led him to this kind of
materialistic nihilism, if he had not been willing to listen. It is important to highlight at
this point that, like the impassivity (apatheia) recommended by the Stoics, the tendency
for emotional restraint imparted by Kṛṣṇa does not imply that Arjuna should reppress
his emotions. As we have already indicated, Arjuna’s confusion and despair seem to be
entirely understandable. What Kṛṣṇa tries to make his disciple see is that these
emotional states are due to an error of vision or, using a Stoic terminology, they are
due to an “error of judgment”. Hence the importance of purifying the intellect.
Addressing the doctrine of emotions in Epictetus, A.A. Long offers an explanation that
might serve to understand Kṛṣṇa’s recommended impassivity of character:
Indeed, they [the Stoics] insisted, only a rational mind can act irrationally, meaning
commit errors of judgement. And with this thought we reach the central Stoic doctrine:
such emotions as anger and jealousy are basic errors of value judgement, mistakes in
reasoning, impulses or motivations that exceed a correct and appropiate response to our
situation. […] we make ourselves angry or jealous because we misjudge the harm we think
is being done to us. (Long 2006, 380)

Following this line of interpretation, the tamasic intellect is described in the Gītā
as one which confuses what is right (dharma) with what is wrong (adharma), and
assigns all things the opposite values (sarvārthānviparītaṃśca). Likewise, the rajasic
intellect is characterized by wrongly distinguishing (ayathāvat) what is right (dharma)
and what is wrong (adharma), what should be done (kārya) and what not (akārya). The
classes of the intellect according to the three guṇas are explained in chapter eighteen
of the Gītā in terms of value assignment. An intellect shrouded in darkness (tamasāvṛtā)
will assign wrong values to phenomena, as will a passionate intellect (whose quality is
the rajo-guṇa). On the contrary, a sattvic intellect is one that knows how to effectively
distinguish between active and inactive, what should be done and whatnot, and
ultimately knows how to recognize bondage (bandha) and distinguish it from liberation
(mokṣa). The sanskrit term ‘guṇa’ (“strand”, “attribute”, “quality”) is a universal
concept in Indian philosophy, and can qualify its object from many different levels as
Kapani shows when she recognizes in the guṇas a triple qualification: moral,
psychological, and physical (1993, 417). However, in our opinion, it is undeniable that
this term is used periodically to describe emotional or phenomenological states. Tamas
is associated with depression, fear, and dark emotional states, in which the vision of
the intellect is clouded. Arjuna's bewilderment at the beginning of the Gītā gives us an
idea of the tamasic emotional state in which he finds himself, which leads to severe
flaws in his reasoning, as he attributes erroneous or disproportionate values to the
situation. With this guṇic qualification of the intellect (and also of the knowledge
[jñāna], the agent [kartā] and the resolution [dhṛti]; BG, 18.19-35) it may be expressed
the idea that emotions determine and condition cognitive states, that is, the domain of
the judgment and beliefs that we normally know as “propositional attitudes”. However,
to purify this intellect will not only require rhetoric or argumentation since working on
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the discursive level is not enough, even if it is necessary. Stoic rationalism distances
itself considerably from the philosophy of the Gītā regarding the remedy proposed to
purify this intellect and perhaps with regard to the reasons why this intellect has
clouded over. The reason Arjuna's intellect has reached a tamasic state is his
forgetfulness of Kṛṣṇa, which implies a forgetfulness of the Self that Arjuna is. This
memory will not be replaced by merely employing the weapons of rational
conversation or logical thinking, although training the intellectual organ (buddhi) is
important, given that with an armed intellect of resolution and determination, peace can
be gradually achieved (BG, 6.25). But if there is something that causes the loss of the
intellect, it is forgetfulness or confusion of memory (smṛtivibhramaḥ) as Kṛṣṇa puts it
in the following stanza: “From anger (krodhāt) arises delusion (sammohaḥ), from
delusion, confusion of memory (smṛtivibhramaḥ), and confusion of memory produces
the ruin of intellect (buddhināśāḥ) because of which, [the yogi or the yogini] perishes.”
(BG, 2.63)8. Therefore, the intellectual vision of the yogi depends on the power of his
memory that does not consist in a mere retentive capacity, but in a presence that remains
constantly receptive to divine friendship, even in the worst stages of the path. Thus,
memory is linked to devotional exercise and this determines the vision of the devotee,
which in turn results in the mastery of buddhi-yoga, granted only to the most sincere
and persevering lovers. In our view, the nexus between devotion and memory needs to
be reviewed, since a two-way relationship seems to be established: on the one hand,
devotion awakens memory; on the other, the memory of the seeker allows him/her to
grow in devotion, which it always implies growing in peace and trust, for peace is not
contemplated as a mere flat scenario, already given and closed, but as a passage of
successive steps through which the devotee can always continue to deepen.
3. MEMORY AS A BIOS TECHNE
In the following pages, we show how memory can give rise to different ways and styles
of life, even becoming a bios techne to assimilate philosophical doctrines which are
opposite by nature. On the one hand, the Gītā is presented not only as a dialogue about
the memory of Self but also as a means to exercise this memory. Kṛṣṇa Himself
considers the study of this text as an “offering of knowledge” (BG, 18.70). Furthermore,
memory placed at the service of the Divine Friend gives rise to a way of life in which
the mind is purified and which can lead us to the meeting of Kṛṣṇa, either in life or after
death. On the other hand, memory plays a very important role in the pedagogy of the
Epicurean School, since Epicurus recommends his disciples to memorize and learn his
ethical precepts, in order to avoid unfounded fears and to be able to achieve peace of
mind (ataraxia). One of the worst threats of this mental peace is the fear of death, and
to overcome it the Epicurean disciple must remember that the human being is nothing
more than an atomic structure and that his/her death represents nothing more than the
dissolution of said material composition. Thus, although the two philosophies should
8

Further on, it will be indicated that the anger (krodha) from which the delusion emerges according to
this verse, is closely related to desire (kāma). See BG, 3.37-40.

Comparative Philosophy 11.2 (2020)

FERRÁNDEZ-FORMOSO

50

be practiced and memorized by all those who seek the serenity of mind, their contents
and teachings are not only different but opposite.

3.1 SMṚTIPATHA OR THE ROAD TO MEMORY
In chapter twelve of the Gītā, devoted to Bhakti yoga (“yoga of devotion”), we find an
idea of devotion connected to an exercise of concentration in Kṛṣṇa. The act of
worshiping is conceived as the constant task of remembering the divinity, according to
which, the yogi or the yogini constantly focus their mind, intellect, and senses on Kṛṣṇa.
Thus, we can read: “Those who let their mind enter into me, whose intention is always
set on me, endowed with a supreme faith, are the most esteemed [yogis]” (mayyāveśya
mano ye māṃ nityayuktā upāsate; śraddhayā parayopetāḥ te me yuktatamā matāḥ; BG,
12.2). The discipline of focusing the mind on divinity could be understood as a
repetition technique (i.e. keeping the mind and the senses directed towards the same
purpose), but driven by a sincere faith (śraddha) and affection (prītipūrvakam). This
faith and this love cannot be trained, that is, they cannot be acquired through repeated
techniques or through effort. However, by virtue of constantly reminding the divinity
these two dimensions can be deepened. In other words, through “memory training”
(understood as an exercise of “constant meditation on”), the yogi or the yogini can grow
in love and faith. The remembrance of Divine-friend involves devotion, and in turn, the
exercise of devotion contributes to memory expansion. This mutual relationship
between memory and devotion, and the practice of keeping the mind, intellect and
senses directed to the Divine Friend, becomes important if we bear in mind that only
this determination prevents the yogi or the yogini from falling into the hole of lower
desire. Kṛṣṇa warns Arjuna that the desire (kāma), described as the eternal enemy of
the knower (jñānino nityavairiṇā), since it conceals knowledge (āvṛtaṃ jñānam), and
displays, in return, an insatiable fire (duṣpūra-anala; BG 3.39), dwells precisely in the
intellect (buddhi), the mind (manas) and the senses (indriyāṇi; BG, 3.40). Therefore,
practicing the memory on Kṛṣṇa becomes a way to expel this inhabitant, enemy of
divine life, from the immediate vicinity of our own cognitive-sensitive instruments.
The body as a battlefield (kṣetra), so contemplated by Abhinavagupta, acquires all its
sense at this point. Somehow, the constant remembrance of Kṛṣṇa serves to counteract
the influence of other thoughts and other purposes that appear in the yogi or yogini's
path in order to distract him/her, and that could relive the fire of this desire (kāma)
closely related to anger (krodha), which in turn could give way to confusion of memory
(smṛtivibhramaḥ) and of this, to the very ruin of the intellect (buddhināśāḥ). In order
to avoid this descending sequence, it is crucial to create impressions of memory
(“saṃskāras”)9 that are strong and firm enough to eradicate others normally installed
9

In what can be considered the most exhaustive investigation conducted on this pan-Indian concept,
Lakshmi Kapani indicates that the term ‘saṃskāra’ appears, for the first time, in the Canon pāli. Since
until that moment, only the verbal form from which the term derives had been used, namely ‘saṃskṛ’
(“to put together”, “to make perfect”, “to purify”). However, the term ‘saṃskāra’ must be considered a
crucial term on the stage of Indian philosophy, in the same way as terms ‘dharma’, ‘karma’, ‘mokṣa’, or
‘yoga’. See Kapani 1993, 505.
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in the nature of the yogi or the yogini. This substitution of some subconscious
impressions with others is a crucial and recurring aspect of Patañjali's yoga: “From this
wisdom [prajñā] is born the saṃskāra that prevents other saṃskāras from arising”
(“tajjaḥ saṃskāro'nyasaṃskārapratibandhī”; Yogasūtra, 1.50). It is not our intention
to explore here the fundamental role that saṃskāras play in Patañjali’s method, nor the
classification that this philosopher makes of them in his famous treatise Yogasūtra
(“The aphorisms of Yoga”; fourth century CE). On the one hand, we have mentioned
this aphorism of Patañjali just because Abhinavagupta himself quotes it to comment
the verses in which Kṛṣṇa explains how the yogi or the yogini at the time of death can
(and should) remember Him in order to attain liberation (see GS, 8.5-6-7). On the other
hand, it is important to highlight the fact that the repeated practice (abhyāsa) of a series
of exercises, which constitutes the basis of any form of yoga, under a plenty variety of
different techniques, beliefs and developments, has as one of its first objectives to
replace some subconscious tendencies with others, giving rise to a subsoil founded on
memory, that is, endowed with a sort of transcendental knowledge which is usually
understood as a form of re-cognition or re-union. From this perspective, the training of
a memory established in the divinity, constitutes a specific way of life (it becomes a
“bios techne”) and requires a constant practical commitment to humility and listening
to the Divine Friend, but also demands the ability to face the truth about ourselves and
the world. Furthermore, the exercise of memory acquires vital importance at the
decisive moment of the transit between life and death. Kṛṣṇa indicates that the person
who, at the time of death (antakāle), abandoning the body (muktvā kalevaram),
remembers Him (mām smaran), surely attains Him after having died (BG, 8.5). This
issue gives rise to a more general reflection on the importance of that liminal experience
because at that threshold-instant, impressions rooted in memory act as a compass that
determines the destiny of the soul: “That which the mind remembers when it leaves the
body, in that becomes, son of Kuntī, plunged into it” (yaṃ yaṃ vā'pi smaranbhāvaṃ
tyajatyante kalevaram; taṃ tamevaiti kaunteya sadā tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ; BG, 8.6).
Commenting on this verse, Abhinavagupta will wonder if Kṛṣṇa means that the person
must remember Him at the precise moment of his/her death, even though the mind and
senses (i.e. the cognitive abilities, including memory) are already fading. However,
everything seems to indicate that Kṛṣṇa's main objective is to make Arjuna understand
the need to remember Him at all times (sarveṣu kāleṣu), and this is synonymous, once
again, of focusing the mind and intellect on Kṛṣṇa (mayyarpitamobuddhirmām;
BG,8.7). Thus, the particular wonder of Abhinavagupta is how the sick person
(asvastha), with all the activities of his/her senses already detained, might be able to
take the road to memory (smṛtipatha) that would lead him/her to Bhagavān. (kathaṃ
cāsvasthāvasthāyāṃ vinivṛttasakalendriyaceṣṭasya bhagavān smṛtipathamupeyāt;
GS,8.5-6). The Kashmiri author will explain that Kṛṣṇa does not refer to the specific
moment of death, but that this final memory refers to the impressions cultivated during
a lifetime. Only the person who has dedicated his life to fix his mind on God can take
this road to memory at the time of his/her death, even if this death occurs by accident
or suddenly. Therefore, we are not talking about a cognitive strategy operated at a
particular time, but about a subconscious memory cultivated during a lifetime through
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constant meditation. Hence Abhinavagupta quotes the aforementioned aphorism of
Patañjali (YS, 1.50), to explain that this exercise of memory, in which devotion
consists- aims to establish a specific subconscious memory fund, capable of
counteracting the settlement of other impressions (saṃskāras) that would lead us to
others roads (i.e. along the saṃsāra route [saṃsārapatha]) after passing away. Thus,
according to Bhagavad Gītā only those who have dedicated their lives to fix the mind
on Kṛṣṇa, shall be quickly rescued from the ocean of Saṃsāra (saṃsāra-sāgarāt; BG,
12.7). It should be remembered at this point the famous verses of the Īśa Upaniṣad in
which the person at the time of his/her death is exhorted to remember the actions
performed during the lifetime: “Let my breath go to the immortal breath and this body
become ashes. Aum remember what you did, mind, –remember, mind, –remember what
you did.” (vāyur anilam amṛtam athedaṃ bhasmāntaṃ śarīram; aum krato smara
kṛtaṃ smara krato smara kṛtaṃ smara; Īśa Up., 17). Som Raj Gupta considers that
these verses do not refer to the physical and literal death of the person, but to “the death
of the body-ego” that is now replaced by the “divine presence”, as a result of a life
devoted to delivering mind and deeds constantly to God. In this sense, Raj Gupta also
emphasizes that this memory at the definitive moment is the outcome of a lifetime of
surrender: “This replacement, this usurpation, can take place at the hour of death only
if man has allowed this usurpation to take place in life” (Gupta 1991, 99). From our
perspective, it seems clear that transcendental memory, which leads us to the Divine
Friend and frees us from the cycle of reincarnations, is the result of a lifetime of practice
and devotion, and does not refer to a mere cognitive operation performed in a particular
moment Therefore, the cultivation of memory becomes a lifestyle, related to truth,
friendship, listening and devotion. Only then does the memory of the Self settle in the
subconscious, giving rise to underlying impressions that favor the encounter with the
divine regardless of the concrete circumstances of the individual's death. Reaching the
path of immortal dharma (dharmyāmṛtam; BG, 12.20) requires subconscious
impressions that tend towards that eternity, and that lead the soul towards the supreme
desire that the person has cultivated during his/her life. At the same time, these
subconscious impressions can only be created through repeated practice, that is,
through a constant exercise that consolidates the tendency and the object to which we
dedicate our words, our thoughts and our actions. It could be said that through mental
routine we give memory to our intellect, our emotions and our senses, and that is the
best discipline that prevents us from distraction and oblivion. That cognitive tendency,
once consolidated, establishes a pattern that is rooted in the subconscious, and personal
effort then decreases: devotion finally becomes a spontaneous way of being and
relating to the world.
However, regarding this memory/devotion binomial it should be noted that
following the theological line of Kashmir Śaivism, Abhinavagupta seems to conceive
devotion (bhakti) as a synonym for sacred knowledge (jñāna) and the former as an
immersion in or identification with Śiva. For example, in a stanza of the Bhagavad Gītā
in which Kṛṣṇa considers that the best yogi is the one who worships Him with full faith
(śraddhāvānbhajate; BG, 6.47), Abhinavagupta comments: “The knowledge of God
(śeśvarasya jñānasya) is superior to all [other means]” (GS, 6.47). Similarly, in his
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commentary on a similar verse mentioned above (BG, 12.2) in which Kṛṣṇa speaks of
those who let their mind enter into Him (mayyāveśya mano; BG, 12.2.), Abhinavagupta
comments: “The most skilled in Yoga are those immersed in Māheśvara”
(māheśvayayaviṣayo yeṣāṃ samāveṣaḥ; GS, 12.2.). The term 'samāveṣa' (“immersion,
absorption in”; “identification with”) is especially relevant in a tantric treatise such as
Vijñāna Bhairava (henceforth: VBh), where devotion is associated with “mati”, often
translated as “intuitive intelligence” (see Silburn 1999, 165). In a celebrated stanza of
this treatise it is said: “True adoration does not consist of an offering of flowers and
other gifts, but of an intuitive intelligence (mati) firmly established in the supreme
heaven [of Conscience] free from duality. Actually, this worship is [like] the absorption
[in Śiva] proper of the ardent [desire]” (VBh, 147). Curiously, “devotion”, “desire”,
“intelligence”, and “memory”, are all of them possible meanings of the term ‘mati’.
This is, for instance, the kind of wisdom that the child Nasciketas proves to possess
according to Yama, the God of Death10. Som Raj Gupta states that “'mati' can be better
rendered by 'state of being' than by ‘thought’, the literal meaning of the word”.
Describing such state as being “possessed by the [divine] presence and usurped by it
so intimately as to become unconscious of her” (Gupta 1991, 257), the approach of
Som Raj Gupta shed light on the association between worship a the dissolution
/absorption in Śiva established in both the Vijñāna Bhairava Tantra and Abhinavagupta's commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā. Indeed, Kṛṣṇa's teaching falters between
theism to a particular divinity and theism to an universal-absolute-impersonal Brahman,
(eg. “[that devoted person] is fit for becoming Brahman”; brahmabhūyāya kalpata, BG
14.26; “I am the abode of Brahman”; brahmaṇo hi pratiṣṭhāham, BG, 14.27), but
devotion in the Gītā is expressed mostly in dual terms, as a relationship between a lover
and a loved one. However, based on certain stanzas we can infer that the sense of that
devotion is the eternal union that underlies it as a supreme secret, so the conditions of
this devotion in the text itself remain ambiguous, and hence give rise to diverse
interpretations
3.2

EPICURUS’ ATARAXIA:
REMEMBER THAT “DEATH IS NOTHING TO US”
.
One of the goals of the Greek philosopher Epicurus (fourth century BCE) was to lead
his students to both mental pleasure (ataraxia) and bodily pleasure (aponia),
understood respectively as the absence of psychic anxiety and physical pain. The state
of mental serenity or ataraxia was also considered the highest spiritual pleasure,
achievable for all those who practiced the precepts indicated by this philosopher,
normally expressed in the form of maxims so that they could be memorized and
repeated. Indeed, on numerous occasions Epicurus recommends to his disciples the
practice and memorization of his ethical 'slogans' (Epistle to Menoeceus 122-123-135;
Epistle to Herodotus, 35-36-37,82). This synthesis strategy could also have been a way
10

See Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.9, where we are told that “this kind of wisdom cannot be obtained through
reasoning” (naiṣa tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā).
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of attracting students and new adepts, reason why some contemporary scholars point
out the markedly “advertising” or “apostolic” character of the pedagogy of this
Hellenistic school11 . However, little or nothing is known about the organization or
management of the so-called “Hellenistic institutions”, and the Epicurean communities
do not represent an exception to this gap12. In fact, Phillip Mitsis (2005, 469) reproaches
Martha Nussbaum for having elaborated a narrative regarding the organization and
pedagogy of the Epicurean school for which we do not have sufficient textual evidence.
Although it is known that the main ideas of this Hellenistic school continued to be alive
centuries after the death of their founder, with the rise of Christianity and religious
mysticism these doctrines will become marginal, and the influence of Epicurean
philosophy will decline severely from the second century CE. The Epicurus’ texts that
we have preserved conceive pleasure (hēdonē) as the supreme of goods, the “beginning
and end of a completely happy life” (kaì dià toũto tḕn hēdonḕn arkhḕn kaì télos légomen
eĩnai toũ makaríōs zē̃n; Ep. Men. 128), and yet, this Epicurean happiness (eudaimonía)
has more to do with a rule of moderation than with voluptuousness or excess, often
wrongly attributed to this school. In numerous passages, Epicurus tries to deny this
common misunderstanding13 specifying that the pleasure he refers to is the absence of
pain in the body or distress in the mind. (allà tò mḗte algeĩn katà sō̃ma mḗte taráttesthai
katà psukhḗn; Ep. Men. 131)
hótan oũn légōmen hēdonḕn télos hupárkhein, ou tàs tō̃n asṓtōn hēdonàs kaì tàs en
apolaúsei keiménas légomen, hṓs tines agnooũntes kaì oukh homologoũntes ḗ kakō̃s
ekdekhόmenoi nomízousin, allà tò mḗte algeĩn katà sō̃ma mḗte taráttesthai katà psukhḗn.
When we say that pleasure is the only purpose, we do not refer to the pleasures of the
decadent and the libertines, as defended by those who do not know our doctrine or disagree
with it or misinterpret it, but [we refer] to the fact of not feel pain in the body or distress in
the soul. (Ep. Men. 131)

Furthermore, in the Letter to Menoeceus it is said explicitly that the choice of
suitable pleasures is determined by a prudent judgment (phronēsis), and therefore,
11

“Epicurus, however, had no scruples about using the tactics of the advertising man in attracting the
attention of his audience” (Long 2006, 178)
12
A.A. Long and Phillip Mitsis vehemently highlight this gap regarding our knowledge of the Epicurean
school. For example, Long states that "we know little about the organization of the original Garden and
even less about other Epicurean amenities” (2006,179). And Mitsis (2005, 469) argues that “there is no
serious evidence to suggest that Epicurus himself ever envisaged groups coming together to live in the
Garden in obedience to his principles; nor do we have any evidence of any permanent residences in the
Garden at any period”.
13
See Epicurus' Sententiae Vaticanae, 81: “The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy
created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honour and respect in the eyes of the mob
or by anything else that is associated with causes of unlimited desire”. The same idea can be found in a
fragment of a preserved letter from Epicurus and adressed to an unknown recipient: “I am thrilled with
pleasure in the body, when I live on bread and water, and I spit upon luxurious pleasures not for their
own sake, but because of the inconveniences that follow them”. These two translations belong to the
classic work of Cyril Bailey 1926, 119, 131.
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exercising this ability is more important than philosophy itself (Ep. Men., 132). The
Greek term ‘phronēsis’, often translated as “wisdom”, “judgment” or “reason”, is a key
concept in Ancient Greek philosophy, from Plato to the sophists, through the
Hellenistic Schools. Thomas McEvilley, drawing a comparison between Platonic and
Indian philosophy, suggested that this term did not have to be translated as "reason."
Instead, it could be translated as ‘wisdom’ in the Platonic dialogues, “equivalent [...] to
Sanskrit terms such as prajñā and vidyā, which commonly refer to the so-called 'higher'
knowledge, which is said to be beyond "reason" as much as beyond sense perception”
(2002, 189). However, this comparison could not be applied to the use of the term in
Epicurean philosophy, given that this school establishes the senses as the door of
knowledge, and understands that sensory perception is the crucial axis of a happy life
(since the absence of physical or mental pain is determined by the senses). Further on,
we will show that for Epicureans, death itself does not mean anything to us since it
leads to the total stopping of sensory perception. According to this, the Epicurean
judgment or phronēsis does not represent a transcendental wisdom, but the determining
capacity to exercise reason when choosing the appropriate pleasures that could bring
us a happy life, instead of choosing those that could bring us unpleasant consequences
in the middle-long term. Consequently, the fifth of Epicurus' Capital Doctrines (Kyriai
doxai; henceforth KD), establishes what is already anticipated in the Letter to
Menoeceus: the impossibility of a happy life without the exercise of phronēsis.
Ouk éstin hēdéōs zē̃n áneu toũ phronímōs kaì kalō̃s kaì dikaíōs <oudè phronímōs kaì kalō̃s
kaì dikaíōs> áneu toũ hēdéōs; hótōͅ d᾽ hén toútōn mḕ hupárkhei hoĩon zē̃n phronímōs, kaì
kalō̃s kaì dikaíōs hupárkhei, ouk ésti toũton hēdéōs zē̃n. (KD, V)
It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently (phronímōs) and nobly (kalō̃s)
and justly (dikaíōs), [nor again to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living
pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, and is not living prudently
and nobly and justly, cannot possibly live pleasantly.

Therefore, the pleasant life of Epicurus is far from corresponding to our
contemporary idea of “hedonism”. On the contrary, insisting on the benefits of a
prudent and frugal life, Epicurus highlights that simple foods can provide the same
pleasure as delicacies if they satisfy the pain that causes its lack. Taking this idea to its
maximum consequences, the Greek philosopher adds: “bread and water are the greatest
pleasure when those who need it feed on them” (kaì mãza kaì húdōr tḕn akrotátēn
apodídōsin hēdonḗn, epeidàn endéōn tis autà prosenénkētai; Ep.Men.,131). As regards
this invitation to moderation, an apparent similarity could be drawn between the
teaching of Epicurus and that of Kṛṣṇa. Indeed, Kṛṣṇa teaches that yoga is not for one
who eats excessively (nātyaśnataḥ) or fasts too much (na caikāntamanaśnataḥ), nor
for one who sleeps too much or wakes too much (na cātisvapnaśīlasya jāgrato naiva;
BG, 6.16). According to this, one should be a yogi in any circumstance, whether eating,
sleeping or being awake, because the ability to direct the mind to the Self (cittamātmani) in all situations is the quality of the true yogi (BG, 6.17-18). However, at this
point it is already possible to guess one of the important philosophical differences that
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exist between "Epicurean happiness" and the happiness to which the teaching of the
Bhagavad Gītā aspires. For Kṛṣṇa would never consider that happiness from the senses
could be the highest pleasure for a human being, even when it comes to satisfying basic
physical needs (such as the example of “bread and water” mentioned by Epicurus). In
fact, in chapter eighteen of the Gītā, we are told of three kinds of happiness and a clear
distinction is made between happiness that has its source in the senses, and that which
is born of self-knowledge. The way in which these three types of happiness are
described indicates that the yogi should not always trust the information provided by
his own sensations:
yattadagre viṣamiva pariṇāme'mṛtopamam
tatsukhaṃ sāttvikaṃ proktamātmabuddhiprasādajam/
viṣayendriyasaṃyogādyattadagre'mṛtopamam
pariṇāme viṣamiva tatsukhaṃ rājasaṃ smṛtam/
yadagre cānubandhe ca sukhaṃ mohanamātmanaḥ
nidrālasyapramādotthaṃ tattāmasamudāhṛtam/
(BG, 18.37-39)
That happiness born from the clarity of self-knowledge (ātma-buddhi-prasāda-jam) which
at first is like poison (yattadagre viṣamiva) but in the end is like nectar
(pariṇāme'mṛtopamam), is considered sattvic. The happiness that comes from the contact
of the senses with the object (viṣayendriyasaṃyogāt), which at first seems like nectar and
is later like a poison, is considered a rajasic happiness. The happiness that arises from sleep,
laziness and neglect (nidrālasyapramādotthaṃ), both at first and afterward is like a poison
and is considered tamasic.

Thus, sensations can be deceptive: rajasic happiness, originating from the contact
of the senses with their objects, produces a pleasant sensation at first to later be harmful.
The highest happiness according to Kṛṣṇa is the sattvic one, which can produce
unpleasant sensations at the beginning, and require sacrifice and effort for the sensesbut it becomes over time the highest of goods. When determining what is the highest
pleasure, we should not trust our senses, since they respond automatically to external
stimuli and it is up to us to assess the consequences that they will produce in the long
or middle-term. Besides, the greatest good always comes from self-knowledge, a
practice that requires the yogi to control and discipline his sensory capacities. This
discipline of the senses based on self-knowledge is not present in Epicurus since his
recommendations for a moderate life come from the sensory experience that in this way
one suffers less mentally and bodily, or that even a lifestyle based on prudence may
completely absent physical and bodily pain, in which case we would speak of ataraxia
(absence of mental distress) and aponia (absence of physical pain). Far from these
Epicurean formulations are the paths to which the yogi of the Bhagavad Gītā aspires,
and it seems that there is a whole kingdom of transcendent sensations, much deeper
than those produced by the pleasures or sufferings of the senses, that Epicurus did not
even contemplate. This difference between both perspectives has to do with the
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atomistic physics on which Epicurus is based, according to which everything that exists
is explained by reason of a series of atoms circulating in an empty space. Strongly
influenced by Democritus' atomism, Epicurus displays his teachings in the context of
a physics that does not give rise to belief in reincarnation, innate ideas, or the afterlife.
As we are told in one of the fragments of the Vatican collection: “We are born once
and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not
(master) of tomorrow, postpone your happiness” (Sen. Vat., 14)14. Thus, the human
being is also an atomic-material structure and his death means nothing more than the
dissolution of this structure (Bjarnason 2003, 25). Accordingly, our death is nothing
more than the end of our material casing, after which we will completely stop feeling,
pleasure or pain, forever. If in the Bhagavad Gītā the life of the yogi was to be put at
the service of the remembrance of Kṛṣṇa, the precepts of Epicurus must be learned to
remember that there is no afterlife, nor any divinity supervising our movements. The
Epicurean precepts are usually condensed under the famous formula of the four
remedies (tetra-pharmakos) that represent the beginning of his Capital doctrines (KD),
and that Philodemus summarizes in this way: “Don’t fear God, neither death. Good is
readily attainable while bad is easy to endure” (Áphobon ho theόs, anúpopton ho
thánatos. kaì tagathòn mèn eúktēton, tò dè deinòn eukartérēton; Adv. Soph., col. 4.914). On the one hand, Epicurus considers the gods as happy and carefree entities that
do not concern themselves with human affairs. Attributing a positive or negative
influence on our lives is a vulgar mistake that Epicurean disciples should avoid, and
therefore, they are recommended to ignore the popular account of a crowd frightened
by vengeful and capricious gods. Epicurus, however, does not attack the foundations
of religion or the practice of religious rites as such but understands that it must be
devoid of the influence that the masses give it. According to his, the divinities must be
revered and must also represent for us an example of ataraxia to follow since they are
distracted with their own affairs and indifferent to human tasks. Much more radical in
his critique of superstition will be the Roman philosopher Lucretius, adept of
Epicureanism in the first century AD and author of that famous diatribe entitled De
rerum Natura (“On the nature of things”). As some scholars have pointed out
(Summers, 1995), Lucretius does attack religious practices in a forceful way,
considering that they frequently encourage fears and manias of irrational superstition.
In this sense, Epicurus’ attitude towards the gods has always been considered
paradoxical and ambiguous, since he accepts their existence and the rites that are
offered to them, but not the divine influence that they are supposed to exercise in our
lives. This ambiguity does not occur in the case of death. As the second of the Epicurean
remedies says: “Death is nothing to us for that which is dissolved is without sensation;
and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us” (Ho thánatos oudèn pròs hēmãs; tò gàr
dialuthèn anaisthēteĩ, tò d’anaisthētoũn oudèn pròs hēmãs; KD, 2; also Ep. Men., 125).
As we have already indicated, memory plays a very important role in this Epicurean
instruction. For the philosopher urges his students to memorize, repeat, and assimilate
all of these ethical precepts, so that no superstitious or unfounded ideas get in their way
14

We follow here the translation of Cyril Bailey 1926, 107.
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of peace of mind. As we are told in the Letter to Herodotus, “the tranquility of the spirit
is born from freeing oneself from all these fears and from continually recalling the
general principles and fundamental precepts” (Ep. Herod., 82). Also at the end of the
Letter to Menoeceus we find this invitation to the practice of the precepts: “Meditate
therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself, and with a
companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you
shall live like a god among men” (Ep. Men., 135). This last statement should be
appreciated: “you shall live like a god among men”, that is, happily carefree and serene,
according to the Epicurean interpretation of divinity.
Both the Epicurean philosophy and the philosophy of the Bhagavad Gītā appeal to
the memory of the precepts taught, although the differences between the two doctrines
are evident and palpable. Indeed, at the end of the Gītā, the narrator Saṃjaya confesses
that “remembering constantly” (saṃsmṛtya saṃsmṛtya) the sacred conversation
between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, rejoices over and over again (hṛṣyāmi ca muhurmuhuḥ; BG,
18.76). Constantly remembering (saṃsmṛtya saṃsmṛtya) the form of Hari -which
Kṛṣṇa reveals to Arjuna in the eleven chapter-, Saṃjaya's astonishment is enormous,
and he rejoices over and over again (vismayo me mahārājan hṛṣyāmi ca punaḥ punaḥ;
BG, 18.77). In this way, the Bhagavad Gītā is presented not only as a dialogue about
memory but also for memory, as it has the power to awaken the memory in those who
study it. For as Kṛṣṇa indicates, the study of this conversation is also a form of devotion:
“Whoever studies this dialogue between the two of us, will worship me with the
‘offering of knowledge’ ” (jñānayajñena; BG, 18.70). It should be noted that the two
doctrines, claiming very different and even opposite reasons, agree that the fear of death
must be overcome. However, the Gītā urges us to remember that a) our Self is eternal
and therefore cannot kill or die; while Epicurus reminds his disciples that b) the human
constitution is material and finite so death, being the painless state par excellence, it is
harmless. In Epicurean doctrine, memory becomes a technique of life to avoid psychic
suffering caused by fear of the unknown, and of the transcendent; in Kṛṣṇa's doctrine,
memory becomes a life technique that can purify our minds leading us to unite with
Him (or with Brahman), both in life and after death. Furthermore, as Epicurus told us
in a fragment mentioned above, the disciple should learn these precepts in the company
of someone “similar”, that is, in the company of a friend. The Epicurean school is
characterized by the importance it attaches to friendship and Philodemus in his work
On Frankness deals in detail with the parrhesia that begins to be exercised in these
communities of Epicurean friends. The nature of this kind of parrhesia, however, is
not exactly the same as that exercised by the Divine Friend in the Bhagavad Gītā, for
the trascendence of this conversation far exceeds the limits to which Epicurus adheres
in his material consideration of existence. However, both in the material ethics of
Epicurus and in the mystical ethics of the Gītā, the commitment to truth and friendship
is evident, and at the end of the day, both doctrines seek in their own way to lead the
disciple towards a state of peace of mind -even though they will understand this state
in different ways.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, transcendental memory has been characterized as the result of a lifetime
of devotional exercise, the fruit of a life guided by the will to remember the path of Self
and fix the mind on Kṛṣṇa (or Brahman). Through this repeated practice we replace
some subconscious dispositions with others, aimed at liberation. This is the kind of
memory that Kṛṣṇa awakens in Arjuna, through a healing conversation that bears many
similarities with the kind of parrhesia that the Stoic masters exercised with their
disciples. In this case it would be a mystical parrhesia, and the meaning of the words
spoken can only be achieved through receptivity to a listening that goes beyond the
scope of intellectual understanding and incurs in the field of intuitive comprehension.
On the one hand, one of the striking features of parrhesia discourse is that due to its
nature and particular mission, it breaks with the formal rules of rhetorical discourse or
the discourse of philosophical argumentation. Thus, according to Foucault, “the
parrhesiastes is the one who does not have to take into account either the rules of
rhetoric [...] or even the rules of philosophical demonstration” (2012, 174). The main
goal of the parrhesiastes is to transform the soul of the interlocutor, and not to simply
lead him/her towards a logical or speculative understanding:
parrhesia is an action, is such as to act, that it allows the discourse to act directly on the
souls; and parrhesia, to the very extent that it is this direct action on souls, transmits
dianoia itself by a kind of coupling or transparency between discourse and the movement
of thought. (Foucault 2012, 170)

In this case it would be better to invoke not only a transparency between saying and
thinking, but in a much more original way, a transparency between saying and being.
For as Heidegger stated: “Being itself is what re-members (Er-innert), is the authentic
remembrance” (1998, 55), hence why all valuable thoughts are rooted in this source,
and become the result of it. Moreover, the teaching of Kṛṣṇa, the “supreme secret”
(guhyam param; BG, 18.75) that has come to light thanks to the sage Vyāsa, should
not be shared with those who are “not willing to listen” (na-aśuśrūṣave; BG, 18.67),
given that this could mean that they are not simply willing to follow the path of the Self.
As we have already pointed out, in the Bhagavad Gītā there is also a call to remember
the memory, using the dialogue about memory as an exercise for memory.
In the first section of this paper, we have shown that the sacred conversation on
Kurukṣetra takes place due to Arjuna's forgetfulness about the power of Kṛṣṇa, and the
corresponding lack of confidence in victory. Because of this forgetfulness, Arjuna loses
even the very meaning of the struggle, which is why the Gītā becomes the inspired
guide of the Divine Friend Kṛṣṇa. However, Arjuna will once again forget the
conversation held in the Gītā itself, and this particular forgetfulness will lead to another
famous text, the Anugītā (second century CE). Arvind Sharma (1978) has shown the
philosophical similarities and differences between the two texts. However, the most
interesting feature about this succession of forgetfulness is the reproach that Kṛṣṇa
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makes to Arjuna at the beginning of the Anugītā. The Divine Friend cannot repeat the
teaching of the Gītā with the same words since it was the fruit of a yogic inspiration or
“trance” (yogayukta). As Yaroslav Vassilkov indicates, the use of the term ‘yogayukta’
to refer to the mystical state in which Kṛṣṇa found himself on Kurukṣetra battlefield,
has been translated and interpreted in various ways:
K. T. Telang rendered Kṛṣṇa's words ‘I was then yogayukta’ as ‘I was accompanied by my
mystic power’. Arvind Sharma translates yogayukta as simply ‘inspired’. However, the
word is most probably used here in the same sense as in the BhG itself: ‘I was then
practising yoga’, ‘I was in the yogic introspective trance / meditation’ (Vassilkov 2005,

222)
In this trance-like state, Kṛṣṇa's parrhesia takes on a mystical dimension, unable to
be repeated by Kṛṣṇa Himself using the same words. Not only does the disciple Arjuna
remain silent and listen to the teacher's words, intervening only on certain occasions to
ask pertinent questions, but in the course of this listening he is transformed thanks to
the divine truth that comes to us in the form of a parrhesiastic conversation. Hence the
importance we have attached to Arjuna's last words: “The delusion has vanished. I have
regained Memory” (naṣṭo mohaḥ smṛtir labdhā; BG, 18.73).
Finally, in the second section of this paper, by comparing the use of memory made
by the Bhagavad Gītā and the Epicurean school, our intention has been to contribute to
the comparative study of philosophy, reflecting common pedagogical methods that
focus on different philosophical content and ideas. The memory to which both Epicurus
and Kṛṣṇa invite us refers to teachings that involve very different beliefs. However,
both philosophies seek to use these ideas to free humans from fear and provide them
with a certain kind of mental tranquility. Furthermore, commitment to the truth and
trust in the friend are common features in which both philosophies participate, although
important differences arise as we investigate this friendly and transforming truth more
closely. Certainly, many of these issues deserve thorough investigation, but we trust
that this paper may contribute to the comparative study of the philosophy of the Gītā
with other philosophies of Ancient Greece.
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